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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant 
1 1 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950226-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from defendant's conviction for kidnapping, a second-degree 
felony, kidnapping, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995). Therefore, this 
Court has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1994). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. When defendant pled guilty on October 3, 1994 and did not file a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea until November 28, 1994, was his motion barred by the 
thirty-day jurisdictional limitation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995)? 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which this Court reviews 
without deference to the trial court. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). 
2. Is defendant's challenge to the $10,000 fine and mandatory 85 percent 
surcharge precluded because he did not object tc the sentence before the trial court? 
State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993), states the criteria by 
which this Court determines waiver. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Relevant provisions are included in the addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural history 
The State charged defendant with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1995) (R. 5). Six months 
after he was charged, defendant pled guilty to kidnapping, a second-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(d) (1995) (R. 94). The trial court then 
informed defendant of the 30-day time period in which to file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea (R. 154). At the plea, Brooke Wells, Salt Lake Legal Defenders', served 
as defendant's appointed counsel (R. 17). Shortly after entering his plea, defendant 
asked for different counsel and his current attorney, Mary Corporon, was then 
appointed (R. 103). Fifty-five days after he pled guilty, defendant filed a motion to 
extend the time in which to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 106-7). On the same day, he 
also filed a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 113). 
On February 3, 1995, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether defendant had good cause to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 159). Defendant 
testified and the State called Brooke Wells (idj. After hearing the testimony, the trial 
2 
court concluded that defendant had not shown good cause, denied the motion to 
withdraw, and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in prison, 
a $10,000 fine, and an 85 percent surcharge (R. 217-26). 
Statement of facts 
The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R. 8). On April 13, 
1994, defendant was in an apartment in Salt Lake . ^unty when an eight-year old boy, 
H.M. entered. Defendant then shut the door, locked it, and grabbed H.M. by the neck, 
forcing him into the bedroom. Defendant pulled H.M.'s clothes down to his ankles, 
forced him onto a mattress face first and began fondling his buttocks. H.M. began to 
struggle and defendant banged H.M.'s head into a wall and told him to shut up. 
Defendant's conduct ended when two individuals knocked on the apartment door. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should not review *he merits of defendant's appeal because, due to 
his failure to request withdrawal of his guilty plea within 30 days, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the merits. The 30 day time limit is jurisdictional and, unlike 
other jurisdictional deadlines for filing notices of appeal and petitions for certiorari, 
Utah Coat Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) does not allow for extensions of time after the initial 
30 day period. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of a $10,000 fine 
also should be rejected on procedural grounds because he did not object at trial and 
does not now argue plain error. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
1. BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA CAME MORE THAN 30 DAYS 
AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE PLEA, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
REVIEW THE MERITS OF THE REQUEST AND 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION ON THAT 
BASIS. 
When defendant entered his guilty plea, the trial court told him that he had 30 
days to request to withdraw it (R. 154). Because the trial court provided defendant this 
information, the 30-day time limit in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) became 
jurisdictional and should have precluded the trial court from considering the merits of 
the request. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 583-84 (Utah App. 1992). On appeal then, 
this Court need not decide the merits of defendant's request, but should deny the appeal 
solely due to the untimeliness of the request. Defendant's motion to extend the time to 
withdraw his guilty plea does not save the withdrawal request because that motion also 
was filed after the jurisdictional time limit had expired (R. 106). 
Procedurally, the trial court lost jurisdiction to withdraw the plea thirty-one days 
after defendant entered it, i.e., on November 3, 1994. Section 77-13-6 does not allow 
a defendant to resurrect jurisdiction by filing a late motion to extend time. Compare 
Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (1995) (allowing extension of time to file notice of appeal after 
expiration of thirty days) ami Utah R. App. P. 48(e) (1995) (providing extension 
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procedure for late petitions for certiorari after lapse of thirty days) with Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(d) (1995) (not providing for extensions). Therefore, the court did 
not have jurisdiction over defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea despite its 
holding of an evidentiary hearing and refusal to deny solely on timeliness grounds (R. 
218). In Price, this Court specifically held that, because the 30-day time limit was 
jurisdictional, it could not be waived and, thus, could be raised for the first time on 
appeal. Eltee., 837 P.2d at 583; Olson v. Salt Lake School District. 724 P.2d 960, 964 
(Utah 1986) (acquiescence is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, which can be raised for 
the first time on appeal). Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain 
the merits of defendant's withdraw. motion, this Court should deny the appeal. 
D. BECAUSE DEFEND. NT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE 
FINE, TfflS COURT fcHOULD NOT REVIEW HIS 
CLAIM OF AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON 
APPEAL. 
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of a $10,000 fine 
and the 85 percent mandatory surcharge as an abuse of di;v retion. Br. of Defendant at 
12. Defendant's sentencing occurred immediately after the court denied his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea on February 3, 1995 v his current counsel, Mary 
Corporon, was his attorney (R. 225 26). The court sentenced defendant pursuant to 
statute, committing him to prison for an indeterminate term of -•!. --to-fifteen years and 
imposing a $10,000 fine (R. 225-26). Along with the fine, L\C court imposed the 
5 
surcharge that Utah Code Ann. § 63-63a-l(l) (1993) mandates and restitution (R. 226). 
Defendant did not object but instead, responded in the negative to the court's question 
whether anything had been overlooked (isL). 
Because defendant did not give the trial court the opportunity to address his 
objection to the fine, he cannot now raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See 
State v.Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1994); State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 
801 n.4 (Utah 1990) (affirming that rule precluding review of issues raised for first 
time on appeal applies to sentencing hearings); State v. Snyder. 747 P.2d 417, 421 
(Utah 1987) (refusing to address issue because defendant did not object to restitution 
order in trial court); State v. Bywater. 748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987) (applying to 
sentencing issues the "longstanding rule" that issues raised for the first time on appeal 
are waived). Defendant can avoid the consequences of his waiver only if he shows 
plain error. State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). However, he has not 
argued that plain error occurred. Therefore, this Court should refuse to address the 
merits of defendant's sentencing challenge. Bywater. 748 P.2d at 569. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
6 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPIMON NOT REQUESTED 
Because the facts and arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, and 
because this case does not present an issue requiring further development or 
clarification, the State does not request oral argument or publication. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TfflS2£&»y of July 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
iS'H: BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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63-63a-L Surcharge - Application and exemptions. 
(1) (a) A surcharge shall be paid on all criminal fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by 
the courts. 
(b) The surcharge shall be: 
(i) 85% upon conviction of a: 
(A) felony; 
(B) class A misdemeanor; 
(C) violation of Title 4F, Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless 
Driving; or 
(D) class B misdemeanor not cL:.csified within Title 41, Motor Vehicles, including violation 
of comparable county or municipal ordinances; or 
(ii) 35% upon conviction of any other offens- including violation of county or municipal 
ordinances not subject to the 85% surcharge. 
(2) The surcharge shall not be imposed: 
(a) upon nonmoving traffic violations; 
(b) upon court orders when the offender is ordered to perform community service work in 
lieu of paying a fine; and 
(c) upon penalties assessed by the juvenile court as part of the nonjudicial adjustment of a 
case under Section 78-3a-22. 
(3) (a) The surcharge and the exceptions under Subsections (1) and (2) also apply to all fines, 
penalties, and forfeitures imposed on juveniles for conduct that would be criminal if committed 
by an adult. 
(b) However, the surcharge does not include amounts assessed or collected separately by 
juvenile courts for the Juvenile Restitution Account, which is independent of this chapter and 
does not affect the imposition or collection of the surcharge. 
(4) The surcharge under this section shall be imposed in addition to the fine charged for a 
criminal offense, and no reduction may be made in the fine charged due to the surcharge 
imposition. 
(5) Fees, assessments, and surcharges related to criminal or traffic offenses shall be 
authorized and managed by this chapter rather than attached to particular offenses. 
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michic Company 
76-3-30L Fines of persons. 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not exceeding: 
(a) $10,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the first degree or second degree; 
(b) $5,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the third degree; 
(c) $2,500 when the conviction is of a class A misdemeanor; 
(d) $1,000 when the conviction is of a class B misdemeanor; 
(e) $750 when the conviction is of a class C misdemeanor or infractiaia; and 
(f ) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute. 
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership, government, or 
governmental instrumentality. 
(c) 1953-1995 By The i tichie Company 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory 
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filea in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under 
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court 
by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, 
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the 
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice 
of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the 
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this 
rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before 
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and 
on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other 
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal 
was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period 
last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 
days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties 
in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michic Company 
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77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to com action. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made 
within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
t Company 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the final decision by the Court of Appeals. 
The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the petition. 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refixse to receive any petition for a writ of certiorari 
which is beyond the time indicated in paragraph (a) of this rule or which is not accompanied by 
the docket fee. 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari runs 
from the date the decision is fentered by the Court of Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of 
the remittitur. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the 
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of rehearing or of 
the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing. 
(d) Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule; or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari. 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of this rule will not be 
granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is granted. 
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the cross-petition. The clerk shall refuse 
any cross-petition not accompanied by the docket fee. 
(4) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other filing. The clerk 
of the court shall refuse any filing so joined. 
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good 
cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or 
(c) of this rule, whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise requires. Notice of any 
such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of 
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) The number of copies to be filed and served shall be the same as provided in Rule 26. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992.) 
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company 
ADDENDUM B 
837 P.2d 578 
(Cite as: 837 P.2d 578) 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 
Micheal D. PRICE, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 910111-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jul) 23, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., of 
aggravated assault, and he appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, Associate P.J., held that: (1) 
guilty plea was voluntary, and (2) motion to 
withdraw guilty plea was untimely. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, P.J., concurred specially and filed 
statement. 
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <$=» 1028 
110kl028 
Defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial 
court is barred from asserting it inh ally on 
[2] CRIMINAL LAW <$=> 1028 
110kl028 
Appellate court may address issue for first time on 
appeal if trial court committed plain error or there 
are exceptional circumstances. 
[3] CRIMINAL LAW 3=> 273(4.1) 
110k273(4.1) 
Formerly 110k273(4) 
Strict compliance with criminal procedures for 
guilty pleas can be accomplished by maniple means 
so long as record reflects that all requirements have 
been fulfilled. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-1 l(5)(g) 
(Repealed). 
[4] CRIMINAL LAW *=> 273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) 
Defendant's plea affidavit and plea colloquy 
transcript reflected that court had complied with all 
requirements for accepting defendant's guilty plea; 
trial court established that defendant understood 
elements of offense, and had discussed affidavit with 
counsel and understood it, and thus, reflected that 
plea was voluntary. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-1 l(5)(g) 
(R^oealed). 
[5] CRIMINAL LAW <S=* 274(9) 
110k274(9) 
Defendant's failure to file motion to withdraw guilty 
plea within time period allowed by statute deprived 
trial court of jurisdiction to hear motion, where 
court had informed defendant of time limit at plea 
hearing. U.C \1953, 77-13-6(2)(b); 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-1 l(5)(g) (Repealed). 
[6] CRIMINAL LAW <3=* 1044.2(1) 
HOkJO^ 2fl) 
Althc-z: s: *e failed to raise issue of timeliness of 
defener < XIK,. on to withdraw his guilty plea 
before tn*4, „ ^ur. ." suit of Appeals could address it 
for first time w.- appeal because it presented 
jurisdictional question. U.C.A ' ' 77-13-
6(2)(b); U.C.A.1953, 77-35-ll(5)(gj
 sKc^caled). 
{- r*\ \L LAW <&* 274(3.1) 
Formerly U0K274(3) 
Trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to set 
aside guilty plea in light of new evidence. 
[8] CRIMINAL LAW G* 274(8) 
110k274(8) 
Defendant's stateme^s r nng pro se argument to 
withdraw his •: ?h thai he and his neighbors 
believn .. .i.^e, were not sufficient to set 
aside pie n grounds of new, exculpatory evidence; 
defendant failed to present affidavits from potential 
witnesses cr even a plausible versior. of the U y$ 
more la/orable to him. U.C A.. 1953, 7 35-
ll(5)(g) (Repealed). 
•*™ Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City, for 
deu .uant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, 
JJ. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
i-'tfendant Micheal Dean Price appeals the trial 
court's denial of his pro se motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea to a charge of attempted aggravated 
assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and -102(4) (1990). We 
affirm. 
Copr. • West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
837 P.2d 578 
(Cite as: 837 P.2d 578, »579) 
Page 2 
FACTS 
Defendant was arrested and charged with 
aggravated assault, a third-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), 
resulting from a domestic dispute. On December 
18, 1990, pursuant to a plea agreement, -defendant 
pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of attempted 
aggravated assault, a class A jnisdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 
102(4) (1990). 
During the plea proceeding, defendant's counsel 
informed the court he had discussed the entry of a 
guilty plea with defendant "on numerous occasions" 
and was persuaded that defendant comprehended 
"the effect and meaning" of such a plea. Defendant 
also stated he had consulted *580 with his counsel 
and understood the guilty plea. 
In connection with his guilty plea, defendant 
executed a "Statement of Defendant." This affidavit 
indicated that defendant's plea was made 
"voluntarily," defendant understood the "nature and 
elements" of attempted aggravated assault, and 
defendant waived certain enumerated "statutory and 
constitutional rights." The affidavit also described 
the elements of attempted aggravated assault. 
Defendant informed the court he had read the 
affidavit, discussed it with his counsel and 
understood it. 
The court reviewed the affidavit on the record 
with defendant during the plea proceeding. 
Specifically, the court questioned defendant about 
the voluntary nature of his guilty plea, the 
constitutional rights defendant was waiving, and 
defendant's understanding of the elements of 
attempted aggravated assault. Defendant expressed 
concern only about his potential sentence. In 
response, the court explained that, while probation 
was not "guaranteed," he would give "serious 
consideration" to the recommendations of the 
prosecution and the Adult Probation and Parole 
office. Following the plea colloquy, the court 
accepted defendant's guilty plea as "freely, 
voluntarily and knowingly executed." The court 
then advised defendant he had the right to move to 
set aside his guilty plea within thirty days. 
By handwritten letter dated January 18, 1991, 
thirty-one days after the plea proceeding, defendant 
notified the court that he wished to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
On January 29, 1991, immediately prior to 
sentencing defendant, the court heard defendant's 
pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although 
defendant was represented by counsel at this 
hearing, defendant argued his motion pro se because 
his counsel did not believe defendant had a valid 
reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. [FN1] 
Defendant asserted he was not guilty of attempted 
aggravated assault, and that neighbors agreed with 
him. The State objected to defendant's motion but 
presented no argument in opposition, including no 
claim that defendant's motion was untimely. The 
court denied defendant's pro se motion because 
defendant "established no legal reason" for the court 
to set aside defendant's guilty plea. 
FN1. At the hearing, defendant's counsel stated: 
My belief is that in order to file a motion, we need 
to have a valid reason, so it sort of puts me at odds 
with Mr. Price. His expression to me was he'd 
changed his mind. My reading of the statute is that 
does not provide a reason for change of plea, but he 
may want to talk to you about it, but it sort of puts 
me in an awkward position. 
On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred 
by: (1) Accepting defendant's guilty plea without 
establishing that defendant understood the "nature 
and elements of the offense," thus failing to comply 
with Rule 11 of' the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; and (2) denying defendant's pro se 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in view of new 
evidence favorable to defendant and the fact that his 
initial plea was not voluntary. The State responds 
that we do not have jurisdiction of this appeal as 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was 
untimely. 
RULE 11 AND VOLUNTARY PLEA 
Defendant first argues the trial court failed to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the common 
law requirements of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), in accepting his guilty plea. 
Specifically, defendant alleges the trial court failed 
to adequately establish that he understood the nature 
and elements of the offense charged and, thus, that 
his plea was voluntary. The State correctly contends 
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defendant raises these arguments 'for the first time on 
appeal. 
[1][2] As a general rule, "a defendant who fails to 
bring an issue before the trial court is bdJrred from 
asserting it initially on appeal." State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.1991); 
accord State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
1989). However, an appellate court may address an 
issue for the first time on appeal if: "(1) the trial 
court committed 'plain error,' or (2) there are 
'exceptional circumstances.* " *581 Archambeau, 
820 P.2d at 922. We find neither. 
[3] In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court: declared:: 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the 
burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) 
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered." [FN2] Id. at 1312. The Utah Supreme 
Court recently clarified the test for reviewing the 
validity of post-Gibbons guilty pleas in an advisory 
opinion, State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 
1992). In Maguire, the supreme court stated: 
FN2. Rule 11(e) has been replaced in part by Rule 
11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 
Utah R.Crim.P. 11 amendment notes 
^ye restate our holding 'that (1) strict: 
compliance with the elements of rule 11 is 
required in the taking of guilty pleas and (2) said 
Compliance may be demonstrated on appeal by 
reference to the record of the plea proceedings. 
When plea affidavits are properly incorporated in 
the record (as when the trial judge ascertains in 
the plea colloquy that the defendant has read, has 
understood, and acknowledges all the information 
contained therein), they may properly form a part 
of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance. 
Id. at 217. The court explained the meaning of "the 
record of the plea proceedings" as follows: 
The record before an appellate court must contain 
a basis for [Rule 11(5) ] findings, but that record 
may reflect such a basis by multiple means, e.g., 
transcript of the oral colloquy between the court 
and defendant, contents of a written affidavit that 
the record reflects was read, understood, and 
acknowledged by defendant and the court, 
contents of other documents such as the 
informati n, presentence reports, exhibits, etc., 
similarly incorporated into the record, and so on. 
"Tierefore, "strict: compliance can be 
accomp ed by multiple means so long as no 
requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the 
record reflects that the requirement has been 
t ulfPV m V. 
Defends. w«***« die trial court failed to 
adequately inform him of the elements of the offense 
charged. Specifically, defendant argues that, when 
he demonstrated confusion during the plea colloquy, 
the trial court rushed him into answering rather than 
clarifying his uncertainty, such that his plea was not 
voluntary. The record reveals that the trial court 
recited the facts and elements of the crime charged 
and asked defendant if they were correct. Initially, 
defendant responded affirmatively. However, when 
the trial court inquired again, defendant apparently 
hesitated. The trial court responded as follows: 
Mr. Price, I'm not going to play games with you. 
If you want to go to trial, then we'll go to trial. 
I'm -not going to spend the morning in here with 
you while you're pondering. 
Now, have you made up your mind? Are you 
going to plead or are you not going to plead? 
We'll go to trial tomorrow morning with a jury if 
you want that. 
Defendant subsequently replied again that he * ished 
to plead guilty. 
[4] We do not find error in the trial court's 
acceptance of defendant's guilty plea, certainly not 
plain error. Our examination of both defendant's 
plea affidavit and the plea colloquy transcript, 
pursuant to Maguire, confirms that all of the 
elements of Rule 11(5) were reviewed, with 
defendant, including his understanding of the 
elements of the offense. Furthermore, the trial court 
established that defendant had discussed the affidavit 
with counsel and understood it. The trial court, 
therefore, met its burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11 requirements were 
satisfied. We are persuaded that defendant 
understood the elements of the offense with which 
he was charged and, thus, that his plea was 
voluntary. 
TIMELINESS OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
Gt JII TYPI EA 
Tli !:! State argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction 
1: z c ::)i:::i sidei defendant's pro se *582 motion to 
ithdi a his g iltt; plea because defendant did not 
file Ms motion within thirty days of 'the plea 
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proceeding, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2)(b) (1990), even though he was informed of the 
thirty-day deadline in the plea affidavit he signed 
and by the judge during the plea colloquy. 
Defendant responds that the State may not raise this 
timeliness issue for the first time on appeal. The 
State concedes the timeliness issue was not raised 
below but claims this question of jurisdiction may 
be raised at any time. 
Section 77-13-6(2)(b) providjfc "A request to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the 
entry of the plea." This time limit, however, must 
be construed in conjunction with Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule ll(5)(g) 
states: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found ... the defendant has been 
advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest." Rule 11(6) 
provides: "Failure to advise the defendant of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty or no contest is not a ground for setting the 
plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the 
time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6." 
Therefore, although the language of section 77-13-
6(2)(b) is unconditional, it is subject to an exception 
incorporated within Rule 11. 
Defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, filed thirty-one days after the entry of 
defendant's guilty plea, was clearly untimely. The 
issue before this court thus becomes whether section 
77-13-6(2)(b), in view of Rule 11, presents a 
jurisdictional question and, thus, whether we may 
consider the State's untimeliness argument for the 
first time on appeal. 
Utah's appellate courts have interpreted time 
limitations in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
similar to that imposed by section 77-13-6(2)(b) as 
jurisdictional. For example, Rule 4 states that a 
notice of an appeal as of right "shall be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the 
date of entiy of the judgment or order appealed 
from." Utah R.App.P. 4(a). Despite this 
"jurisdictional" language, however, the rule also 
provides that trial courts, "upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed 
not later than 30 days" after the initial thirty-day 
deadline. Utah R.App.P. 4(e). Nonetheless, we 
have concluded Rule 4(a)'s thirty-day deadline is 
jurisdictional. [FN3] 
FN3. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522 
(Utah App.1989) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction 
to hear appeal as of right when defendant's notice 
of appeal is untimely and defendant failed to file a 
Rule 4(e) motion to extend); In re M.S., 781 P.2d 
1287, 1289 (Utah App.1989) (per curiam) (court 
remanded case to juvenile court for decision as to 
whether time for filing appeal may be extended 
under Rule 4(e) but noted *[i]f the juvenile court 
declines to extend the time for appeal, the appeal 
will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction"). 
Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
also contains unconditional "jurisdictional" language 
qualified by an exception. It states: "A petition for 
a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of 
the decision by the Court of Appeals." Utah 
R.App.P. 48(a). Nevertheless, the rule provides 
that the supreme court, "upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a 
writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 
days" after the original deadline. Utah R.App.P. 
48(e). The Utah Supreme Court recently interpreted 
this rule in Earle v. Warden of Utah State Prison, 
811 P.2d 180 (Utah 1991). [FN4] In Earle, the 
supreme court determined it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the defendant's petition for certiorari because 
the petition was untimely. See id. at 180. The 
court noted that, because the defendant never filed a 
petition for rehearing with the Utah Court of 
Appeals or a motion to extend the time for filing a 
petition to the supreme court, "the *583 time in 
which a petition for certiorari could be accepted by 
this court expired." Id. at 181. 
FN4. The case refers to Rule 45 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. However, this rule currently 
appears as Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Although Rules 4 and 48 contain provisions which 
allow courts to extend the applicable filing periods 
under certain circumstances, Utah's appellate courts 
have held f at such provisions do not destroy the 
jurisdictional nature of these time limit rules. 
Rather, these provisions merely permit the filing 
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period to be extended if a defendant complies with 
their requirements. 
Defendant cites two recent cases from this court 
which he contends hold that section 77-13-6(2)(b) is 
not jurisdictional. In State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470 
(Utah App.1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1992), the defendant, in September 1989, 
moved to withdraw his no contest plea, pursuant to 
section 77-13-6. See id. at 474. The trial court 
denied the motion. See id 
On appeal, the State argued the defendant's 
motion was untimely. See id. at 475. The State 
contended the April 1989 amendment to section 77-
13-6, adding the thirty-day deadline for filing a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, should apply 
retroactively to the defendant. See id. This court 
found it unnecessary even to reach the retroactivity 
issue because "the State's untimeliness argument was 
not raised in the trial court, and was therefore not 
preserved for appeal." Id. at 476. 
Wc followed the reasoning of Smith in State v. 
Quintana, 826 P.2d 1068 (Utah App.1991), In 
Quintana, the defendant appealed the denial of his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See id. at 1069. 
The State conceded the trial court violated Rule 11 
in accepting the plea but argued the thirty-day 
deadline of amended section 77-13-6 should apply 
retroactively, rendering the trial court without 
jurisdiction to address the defendant's motion. See 
id. Looking to Smith, this court noted that there 
"the State had failed to preserve appellant's lack of 
compliance with the statute as an issue to consider 
on appeal." Id. Therefore, we reversed and 
remanded, 'instructing the trial court to grant the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
Defendant has missed the crucial distinction in 
these cases. Both Smith and Quintana involved 
defendants who pleaded guilty before the thirty-day 
filing deadline was added to section 77-13-6. 
Therefore, at the time the Smith and Quintana 
defendants entered their pleas, they were not 
informed of the thirty-day time limit for filing a 
motion to withdraw their pleas because there was 
none. Thus, the jurisdictional nature of section 77-
13-6 was not triggered. 
(5J In contrast, defendant in the present case was. 
informed at the time he pleaded guilty that he had 
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only thirty days in'.which to file a motion to 
withdraw his plea. This is the first time this court 
has considered the application of the thirty-day 
filing period in section 77-13-6(2)(b) when the 
record shows that a defendant was informed of the 
thirty-day deadline. If the timeliness issue had been 
properly addressed in the trial court, that court 
would have been without jurisdiction to hear 
defendant's motion and without a basis for 
extending the time for defend , to file his motion. 
Therefore, Smith and Quintain. which focus on the 
retroactive application of section 77-13-6(2)(b) to 
defendants who were not informed of its thirty-day 
deadline, do not assist defendant. 
Like Rules 4 and 48, the unconditional, 
jurisdictional nature of section 77-13-6(2)(b)'s filing 
deadline is not destroyed when read in light of the 
exception in Rule 11 allowing that deadline to be 
extended if a defendant has not been informed of the 
thirty-day time period. If a defendant is informed of 
the statute's thirty-day deadline for filing a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea, section 77-13-6(2)(b) is 
jurisdictional, and a failure to file a timely motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea 'may be raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
[6] Although the State failed to raise 'the issue of 
the timeliness of defendant's pro se motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea before the trial court, we 
may address it for the first time on appeal because it 
*584 presents a jut; : ctional question. See A.J. 
Mackay Co. v. Okk, v -:r. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 
325 (Utah 1991); Siau \ . Davenport, 30 Utah. 2d 
298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 a. 2 (1973). We conclude 
the trial court properly denied defendant's motion as 
it was untimel} 
However, even if we were to reach the merits of 
defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea, we 
would still affirm. We have already concluded that 
defendant's plea was entered in compliance with 
Rule 11(5) and Gibbon* and, thus, that defendant's 
plea was voluntary. Therefore, defendant's first 
ground for setting aside his plea is without merit. 
However, defendant also claims the trial court erred 
by not allowing defendant to withdraw his plea in 
view of new evidence favorable to defendant. 
[7] [8] A trial court may abuse its discretion by 
failing to set aside a guilty plea in light of new 
evidence. [FN5] In the present case, during 
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defendant's pro se argument to withdraw his guilty 
plea, defendant stated the basis for his motion was 
his and his neighbors' belief in his innocence. 
FN5. See, e.g., State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 
424 (Utah 1987) (trial court correctly denied 
defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea because 
of the "implausible timing and suspicious content" 
of new evidence favorable to defendant); State v. 
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042* (Utah 1987) (trial 
court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw guilty plea because of "critical new 
evidence which cast doubt on defendant's guilt," 
i.e., victim's admission that her testimony at 
preliminary hearing wrongly implicated defendant). 
On appeal, defendant argues the testimony of his 
neighbors presents new, exculpatory evidence. 
However, as the State notes, defendant fails to 
present affidavits from potential witnesses or even a 
plausible version of the facts more favorable to him. 
Defendant's motion was supported only by 
defendant's statement that he was not guilty and his 
self-serving conjecture that others believed him 
innocent. These "new" facts are not sufficient to set 
aside his plea. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring specially): 
We hold in this case that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. In view of that holding, it 
is unnecessary (and improper) to opine about the 
merits of defendant's motion. 
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